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1.  BACKGROUND 
On 22 September 1993 the Commission adopted a proposal for a  Council Directive 
on investor compensation schemes.' This was sent to the Council by letter dated 22 
October 1993. 
The Co'!lncil  subsequently for\varded  this text to Parliament and to  the Economic 
and  Social  Co~mittee and  in January  1994  began  its  oWn  examination  of the 
proposal. 
2.  OPINION OF THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE 
2 
The  Economic· and  Social  Committee  unanimously  adopted  an  opm10n  on  the 
Commission proposal at its 312thPlenary Session on 26 January 1994.2 
.. This opinion,  while  advocating a number of technical, amendments  was  basically 
supportive of the Commission proposal. 
A number of the Committee's suggestions have been· inc~rporated in this amended 
p~oposal. 
COM{93) 381  final- SYN 471, OJ NoC 321,27.11.1993, p.  15 .. 
~·  -3.  OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
The European Parliament adopted the legislative resolution embodying its opinion 
on the Commission proposal for a  Council Directive at its sitting on 19 April 1994.3 
Parliament's  largely  favourable  opinion  contained  seven  amendments.  The 
Commission accepted three of these (Nos  1,  3 and 7)  as proposed by Parliament. 
The Commission accepted the spirit of  a further three amendments (Nos 4, 5 and 6). 
Only amendment No 2 (relating to the definition of "investor" in Article 1(4)) was 
rejected  by  the  Commission  since  it  abandoned  the  concept  of  "investment 
business", which the Commission cqnsiders to be a crucial element in its proposal. 
4.  ALIGNMENT ON THE DIRECTIVE ON DEPOSIT GUARANTEE SCHEMES. 
3 
4 
On  30  May  1994  Parliament  and  the  Council  adopted  Directive  94/19/EC  on 
deposit-guarantee schemes.4 
This measure was thus one of the first to be adopted jointly by the two institutions 
under the codecision procedure of  Article 189b of  the Treaty  .. 
Indeed the full  pr~cedure provided for in the codecision arrangements was used; the 
final joint text being agreed in the Conciliation Committee. 
Accordingly  it is an important consideration that  Directive  94/19/EC of 30  May 
1994 on deposit-guarantee schemes represents a jointly agreed view of Parliament 
and the Council on a number of technical  issues that arise  in  identical or similar 
terms in the work on investor-compensation schemes. 
From the start of its work on investor compensation schemes the Commission had 
' 
recognized that there was a link with the parallel but more advanced work in the 
OJ No L 135, 31.5.1994, p. 5. 
2 .  .r•· 
area  of  barik  deposit-guarantee  scheines  (see· Point f-..5, of .t.he  Explanato~ 
.  . 
.  Memorandum ofthe initial proposal on investor compensation schemes).  · 
Both  Parliament and  the  Economic  and  Social  Committee  clearly  recognized  the 
. need. for coherence and consi'stency in the approach to thes~ parallel areas 0 f work. 
In point 3.3  of its opinion the Committee  s~ated that "it is essential that these two 
texts be entirely mutually coherent". 
-Parliament'; opinion  ac~epts that "the· proposal must,  in  the  interests bf legislative 
.  . 
c~he.rence, be  vie~ed in the  co~text ofother Community proposals in the  fi~~cial 
servi~es  ·sector.· In  particuhu  the  propos.al  -m~st be  read  in  co~ju~ction with the 
Com-mission  ·- proposal  for  · a  dlr~ctive  on  deposit-guarantee  schemes  ... ". 
.  .  - . 
(Explanatory statement, point 2, second paragraph). 
Accordingly,  a  number  of  provisions  in  the  amended  proposal  on  ·investor 
. compensation schemes ·have in the interests of legislative consistency been fully or 
.  i).  .  •  '  '.  '  .  •  .  ' 
partially  aligned on .  or  made  consistent with the correspondil1g  provisions of  the 
bank deposit-guarantee Directive 94/19/EC. . 
. Although this alignment has  led to  a certain re-ordering  ~md reorganization of the 
provisions  of this  proposal  and a  considerable amount· of redrafting .  it  must  be 
. stressed that the changes to the basic pri~Ciples tind~rlying the Commission's initial 
proposal are no{·substantial. 
. Be_cause of this extensive redrafting the full text of the  amendedpr~posal is set out 
in this communication  . 
-. 
' 
3 5.  COMMENTS ON AMENDMENTS 
Title and citations 
A  number  of changes  have  been  made  necessary  by  the  transition  from  the 
cooper~tion procedure to the codecision procedure under-Article 189b ofthe Treaty. 
\ 
12th recital 
The  Directive  on  deposit-guarantee  schemes  (Directive  94/19/EC)  having  been 
adopted by Parliament and the Council on 30 May 1994, the official title, reference 
number,  date  and  publication  details  can  now  be  added  here.  Appropriate 
adjustments  to  subsequent  references  to  Directive  94/19/EC  have  been  made 
accordingly. 
15th recital 
It  is now .specified that it should not be necessary for a credit institution providing 
investment services to  belong to two different schemes - under this  directive and 
under Dire~tive 94/19(EC - provided that a single scheme meets the requirements of 
both  directives.  This clarificatjon which reflects. the  Commission's  intention from 
the outset, corresponds to  a wish voiced by the Economic and Social Committee, 
although the  Committee sought this clarification in the  text of the  corresponding 
article. 
18th and  19th recitals · 
These  have  been  adapted  to  make  specific  reference  to  the  proposed  m1mmum 
compensation level of ECU 20 000 and to indicate that this same amount has been 
fixed  by  Parliament  and  the  Council  in  Directive  94/19/EC  as  the  harmonized 
Community minimum level for deposit-guarantee schemes. 
4 .  '  . 
21 st recital 
··  This ~lause, dealing with the possibility open to branches to top up their home State · 
level  of compensation to  the  (higher)  level  available in the  host State  has_ been 
aligned on the corresponding clause in Directive 94/19/EC  . 
26th recital 
This clause, which deals with the regime applicable to branches· of investment firms 
having  their  head  office ·in  a  non-member  country  has_ ·been  brought  into  line, 
mutatis mutandis, with the corresponding recital in Directive 94/19/EC; 
27th recital 
A  new  27th  recital  has  been  added  in  line  with  a  similar  clause  in  Directive 
94/19/EC. This deals with the question of the financing of compensation  schemes~ 
The proposal does not lay down any  detail~d rules but establishes the principle that · 
investment firms $hould finance the schemes themselves, subject to the proviso that 
the burden of financing investor compensation payments resulting fro~ the failure 
of investment firms should not endanger the stability of  otherwise healthy firms. 
This  point  was  raised  in. the _Opinion  of the  Economic  and  Social. Committee 
although the Committee sought a reference in the body of  the directive rather than in 
the preamble. 
Article 1(1) 
This  revised  definition  of  "Investment  firm"  corresponds  to  Parliament's 
.  .  ' .  . 
Amendment No  1 which was  accepted by the Commission  .. Parliament wished to 
make  clear that the concept  of investment  firm  had  already  been .defined· in  the 
· investment Services Directive. 
5 /  Article 1(5) 
.  In its Amendment No 3, which was accepted by the Commission, Parliament called 
for  the  same. definitiqn of "branch"  to  be  included  in  the  investor compensation 
scheme proposal as was included in the Investment Services Directive  .. 
Article 1  (6) 
A definition of "joint  investment'~ has been included.  Although the Commission's 
original ·  pr?pos~l  referre~  to  "joint  investment  accou.nt"  .  this  concept  was  not 
defined. The new definition is based in part on the definition of "joint account"  in 
Directive 94/19/EC. 
Article 2 
Paragraph I 
This paragraph has  been aligned to  some extent on Directive 94/19/EC. In 
particular,  the  Commission.  had  accepted  the  spirit  o{  Parliame~t's 
Amendment :No  4,  namely  that  i{ should  be  clear  that  authorization  was 
based on the principle of  home country control. 
.  . 
There are now.two possible situations in which an investment firffi may not 
belong  to'  an  ihvestor  compensation ·scheme.  These  are  firstly  where  the 
investment firm is a credit institution which belongs to a system, based on 
solidarity, whereby the credit institution will not be allowed to fail. Since the 
intervention of an investor compensation scheme can only be  triggered by 
the  failure  of an  investment  firril  the  fact  that  a  credit  institution  doing 
investment  business belongs to a 'system meeting the requirements of Article 
3(1) of Directive 94/19/EC is suffic.ient to justify exemption also from the 
obligation to belong to an investor compensation scheme. 
The second case where it is possible for an investment firm not to belong to 
a compensation scheme is described in the comments on Article 5. 
6 Paragraph 2 
This paragraph has also been amended to reflect more closely the provisions  . 
of Directive 94/19/EC.  The underlying. principle. that the intervention of the 
scheme is triggered by a decision. of  the competent authorities or of  a judiCial. 
authority is unchanged. 
Similarly, although the three indents setting out the types of claim have been 
'  .  . 
reduced to two, the same cases are covered. 
In its amendment·No 5 Parliament asked for the words "or managed"  to be 
added. The Commission accepted this· amendment which is logical given that 
'  .....  .  ':  '  .  '  . 
the  service  of discretionary portfoiio  management is  one of the  servtces 
falling within the definition of  "investment business'' in Article 1. 
Paragraph 4 
The Commission's original proposal provided for two possible mQments for 
determination  of the  amount  of the  investor's  claim.  For  the  sake  of 
simplicity, and in line with the wishes-ofthe Economic and Social Committee, 
the amended  proposal  refers  solely  to the  moment of the  official .  decision 
referred  to  ih  paragraph· 2.  The  reference ·to  the  "legal ·and  contractual 
conditions  including  those  relating  to  set-off and ·counterClaim  "·  reflects 
.  . 
similar references in Directive 94/19/EC. 
·Article 3 
In its opinion the Economic and  Social Committee had  requested that reference be 
made to Directive 91/308/EEC on money laundering. The Commission agrees that an 
.  . 
article  along  the  lines  of Article  2,  third .  indent _of  Directive  ?4119/EC  is  indeed 
appropriate. 
7: 
i• Article 4 (former Article 3) 
No substantive change has been made ,to this article, although certain minor drafting 
amendments have been made. 
Article 5 
Article  5 of the  Commission's  i11itial  proposal dealt with, two  situations,  namely 
where an  investment firm  fails  to  comply with the  obligations  resulting  from  its 
membership of  its home State investor compensation scheme and, secondly, where a 
. , branch availing itself of  the option to join a host-State scheme on ·a top-up basis fails 
to respect the obligations of  that optional membership. 
These provisions have been reorganized in the amended proposal. 
All of the· provisions relating to  the  top-up arrangements  have  now been brought 
together under the new Article 7 .. 
The new amended Article 5 now deals  solely with the  first of the. two  situations 
outlined above. These new provisions have been very largely aligned on Article 3 of 
Directive  94/19/EC It was  clear to  the  Commission that similar  considerations 
applied .in the context of  the two directives. 
Thus it should be possible for an investment firm ultimately to be expelled from a 
compensation  scheme  if that firm  does  not  fulfil  its  obligations.  However,  such 
exclusion  should  not  take  place  without  the  express  consent  of the  competent 
authorities  which  issued  the  authorization.  In  addition  Member  States should be 
given the option of allowing an investment firm in this situation to make alternative 
arrangements providing investors with equivalent coverage. 
The new text is in line with the spirit of  Parliame~t's Amendment No 6. 
8 . ' 
..  ' 
Article 6 (new) 
This new article corresponds to Article 5 ofDirective 94/19/EC . 
It. may happen that a firm's  authoriZation  is  withdrawn .  without  its  failure  having 
been established.  <;ontinued  coverage by· the  compensation scheme ·is  required  in 
case  it  should  subsequently  transpire  that  the  firm·  was  unable· to ·meet  its 
commitments to investors. 
Article 7 
The provisions dealirig  with the  possibility  open to  a branch to join a  host-State 
scheme to raise (top-up} its home State cover to  the  higher level prevailing in the 
host-State were previously set out in Article 4 ofthe Commission's initial proposal. 
Given that the whole question of top-up had given  ris~ td extensive discussions in 
•  '  +  • 
the context of Directive 94/19JEC the  Commission has pr~ferred to  align as far as 
possible  the  corresponding . provisions  -of its  amended  investor. compensation 
propos~} on the text finally  agreed by.Parliament and the  Council  in t_!le  deposit-
guarantee Directive. 
These provisions therefore i11clude the procedure to be followed wl).en a branch does 
. .  .  .  .  .  .  '  . 
not comply with the obligations resulting from  its top-up membership of the host 
I 
State scheme. 
In addition  a  set of guiding principles  has  been  inCluded  as  Aill).ex  II  modelled 
closely on those in Annex II to Directive 94/19/EC. The inclusion of such an annex 
had been proposed in the report of  the Economic. and Social Committee. 
9 Article 8 
Paragraph 1 now refers to  the aggregate claim rather than to the amount of money 
and instruments. This is more accurate. 
Paragraph 2 relates to joint investment rather than joint account since it is not certain 
that each investor will formally hold an account as such. 
The provisions covering joint investments by  business partnerships, etc.  and those 
concerning investors who  are not absolutely entitled to  the sums or securities held 
are  based  closely  on  the  corresponding  provisions  in · Article  8  of Directive 
94/19/EC. 
Article 9 
Although the  substance of Article  7 of the Commission's initial  proposal  has  not 
been  altered  the  presentation  has. been  amended  to  make  the .intention clearer. 
Clearly investors have to be made aware of the decision referred to  in Article 2(2) 
and a provision to this end has  been added. 
Article 10 
The former Article 8 dealing yvith investor information has been aligned on Article 9 
of  Directive  94119/EC.  The  substance  of the · provisions· remams  unchanged, 
however. 
Article 11 
\ 
The  former  Article  9  of the  Commission's  initial  proposal,  dealing  with  the 
Community branches of investment firms· which have their head office outside the 
Community, has been aligned on the corresponding Article 6 of  Directive 94/19/EC. 
10 \ 
Article 12 
This article (the foriner_ Article 10) dealing with  subrogation is  unchanged except 
.  .  .  .  . .  . 
that the'text now refers more correctly to the co~pensation  scheme'havi~g the right 
of  subrogation. 
Article 13 
Initially the Commission had propo~ed in the 'former Article. I 1 that it should report 
. to the Council on the operation of  the Direction after five years. 
Parliament's Amendment No 7 .requested that the report be made to Parliament as 
well as the Council after three years. 
The  Commission  accepted  this  amendment  and  the  text  has  been  amended 
accordingly. 
Article 14 
The Commission's initial proposal (Article 12) had envisaged thanhe Directive on 
investor  compensation schemes should enter into  force· on 1 January  1996.  This 
..  ' 
reflected  the  wishes  of the  Council,  as  set out in  Article ·  12  of the  Investment 
Services Directive. 
That date now  seems unrealistic and the text has been amended to require Member 
States to comply with the Directive by the end of 1996. 
Article 15 
A  new article  has  been  added  to  formally  repeal  Article  12  of the  lSD,  which 
introduced  an  interim  investor  information  regime  pending  the  adoption of a 
directive on investor compeq.sation schemes. The said Article  12  will cease to  be 
appropriate or applicable as from the entry into force of the specific directive on. 
investor compensation schemes.  · 
11 ANNEX! 
This  annex  lists  the  categories  of investor which  Member States  may decide  to 
exclude from covera~e by the investor-compensation scheme. 
In item No 1 a number of categories have been grouped together under the heading 
of  "institutional investors". 
The amended proposal adds the category (new No 2)  of "professional investors" .. 
This reflects a wish expressed by the Economic and Social Committee and is in line 
with the Investment Services Directive, which in a number of areas recognizes the 
different need for protection of  professional and institutional investors. 
In item No 3 the category of  "supranational authorities" has been added. 
As regards item No 8 (former No  13)  the text  has  been reformulated rather than 
following  the  corresponding  item  in  Directive  94/19/EC,  which  is  not  easily 
transposable to the investment services sector. 
ANNEX II 
See comments on Article 7. 
12 Amended proposal for a European Parliament and 
Council Directive 
. on investor compensation schemes 
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN· 
UNION, 
Having  regard to  the  Treaty establishing the  European· Community,  and.- in particular 
Article 57(2) thereof, 
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission!,· 
Havin~ regard to the opinion of  the Economic and Social Committee2, 
Acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 189b of  the Treaty3, 
1.  Whereas on 10  May  1993  the Council adopted Directive 93/22/EEC on investment 
services in the  securities field4,  hereinafter referred to  as  "the Investment Services 
Directive"; whereas that Directive is an.essential measure for the achievement of the 
internal market for investment firms; 
.  I 
2.  Whereas the Investment Services D.irective secures the essential harmonization that is 
necessary  to  secu;e  the  'mutual  recognition'  of authorization  and  of prudential 
supervision  systems,  making  possible  the · grant  of a . single  authorization  valid 
throughout the  Community  and  the  application of the  principle  of home  Member 
State  supervision;  wherea~,  by  virtue  of mutual  recognition,  investment ·firms 
2 
3 
4 
authorized  in  their. home  Member  States  may  carry  on any  or all  of the  services 
covered . by  the  Investment  Services  Directive  for · which  they  have·  received 
OJ No C 321,27.1 Ll993, p.15 
OJ No L 141, 11.6.1993, p. 27 authorization  throughout  the  Community  by  establishing  branches  or  under  the 
freedom to provide services; 
3.  Whereas  the  protection  of investors  and  the  maintenance  of confidence  in  the 
financial system is an important aspect of  the completion of  the internal market in this 
area; 
4.  Whereas  the  Investment  Services  Directive  provides  for  prudential  rules  which 
investment firms must observe at all times, including rules the purpose of which is to 
protect  as  far  as  possible  investors'  rights  in  respect  of money  or  instruments 
belonging to them; 
5.  Whereas,  however,  no  system  of supervision  can  provide  a  .complete  safeguard, 
particularly where acts of  fraud are committed; 
6.  Whereas  it is  therefore important that each Member State should  have  an  investor 
compensation scheme providing a  minimum  level  of compensation at ·least to  the 
smaller investor in the event that an investment firm is unable to meet its obligations 
to its investor clients; whereas such is not the case at present; 
7.  Whereas  the  Commission's  initial  proposal  for  an  investment  services  directive5 
included in the list in Article 9 of  prudential rules to be observed by investment firms 
and  to  be  supervised  by  the  home  Member  State's  authorities  membership  of a 
general  compensation  scheme  to  protect  investors;  whereas,  however,  the 
Commission proposed that, pending further harmonization of compensation schemes, 
branches should be subject to the compensation scheme in force in the host Member 
State; 
8.  Whereas, however, this interim solution was rejected by the Member States in favour 
of a full  home country approach, given the responsibility of the home Member State 
for issuing the authorization to investment firms and for their prudential supervision; 
OJ No C 43, 22.2.1989, p.  7 whereas it was argued that application of  the home country control principle required 
'  .  I  .  . 
. that the' home State  compen~ation scheme shouid. cover the  activities. carried on  iri 
· :  .:  ' host Member States; through branches or vi~ freedom to provide services; 
9.  Whereas  it  was the  general  view that the  co~plex issues  raised by the. subject  ~f 
investor compensation schemes  could  pe  adequately  d~alt with  only  in  a separate 
· proposal for a directive; whereas Article 12 ofthe Investment Services Directive does 
'  '  .  I 
not  require  Member  States  to  have  an  investor .  compensation  scheme  but  merely  .  .  ' 
requires that  i,nvestors  be  informed of the .  compensation arrangements available,  if 
any;  whereas  the  Commission  stat~d  that  it  would  sub~it  proposals  o~  th~ 
harmonization of  compensation systems covering transactions by investment firms by 
31  July 1993 at the latest; 
I' 
10. Whereas  the  proper  functioning  of  the  internal  . market  reqmres  a  degree  of 
coordination in this area· so that the small investor can purchase investment services 
from  branches  of· Community  investment  firms  or  on  a  cross-frontier  basis  as 
.  . 
~onfidently as from domestic  investm~ri.t firms,  in the knowledge that a  Community . 
minimu~  level of compensation would be available in the event of the failure of the 
investment  firm  and  its  subsequent  inability  to  return  the  investor's  money· or 
securities; 
· 11. Whereas  in  the  absence  of such  coordination  host  Member  States  may  consider 
themselves justified for reasons ofinvestor protection in requiring membership ofthe  .. 
host State compensation arrangements when a Community investment firm operating 
via  a  branch  or  via ·freedom  to •  provide· services  either  belongs  to  no  investor 
compensation scheme in its home Member State or belongs to a scheme which is not 
considered to offer equivalent protection; whereas any such requirement might create 
serious difficulties for the operation of  the single market; 12. Whereas European Parliament and Council Directive 94/19/EC of 30 May  1994 on 
deposit-guarantee schemes6 introduced minimum harmonization of deposit-guarantee 
· arrangements for credit institutions; whereas credit institutions may  in certain areas 
be in competition with specialist investment firms; 
13. Whereas although most Member States currently have some investor compensation  .  . 
arrangements the vast_ majority do not have arrangements corresponding to the scope 
.  . 
of  the Investment Services Directive; 
14. Whereas  therefore  all  the  Member  States  should  be  required  to  have  an  investor 
compensation scheme, or schemes, to which all investment firms  holding the single 
licence under the Investment Services Directive should belong; whereas the scheme 
should  cover  money  or  instruments  which  are  held  by  the  investment  firm  in 
connection with the conduct of investment business and which, following the failure 
of  the firm, cannot be returned -to the investor. 
15. Whereas  the  definition  of investment  firm  includes  credit  institutions  which  are 
authorized to  provide  investment services;  whereas  such  credit  institutions  should 
also be required tq participate in an investor compensa,tion scheme in respect of their 
investment business;  whereas,  however,  it  should not be  necessary for  such credit 
institutions  to  belong  to  two  separate  schemes  where  a  single  scheme  meets  the 
requirements both of this Directive and of Directive 94119/EC; whereas, however, in 
the case of investment firms which are credit institutions it may in certain cases be 
difficult  to  distinguish  between  deposits  covered  under  Directive  94/19/EC  and 
money held in connection with the ~onduct of investment business;  whe~eas Member 
States  should  be  given  the  possibility  of themselves  determining  under  which 
Directive such claims should fall; 
16. Whereas  Directive 94/19/EC allows Member States to  dispense a credit institution 
from  the  obligation  to  belong  to  a  deposit-guarantee  scheme  where  that  credit 
6  OJ No L 135, 31.5.1994, p.  5 
16 institution  belongs to a  system which  pr()tects  the  credit institution  itself and,  iri . 
.  particular, ensures its solvency; whereas,  where  such a credit institution. is  also an 
investment firm,  Member States  should also.· be  authorized to  dispense  it from the 
obligation to belong to an investor compensation scheme; 
17  ..  Whereas  the  cost of investor protection has  to  be  J!iet  by  investment  firms  but  is 
ultimately  pa~sed on to  the investor; whereas therefore it is undesirable to introduce 
throughout the  Community a very high  level of protection; whereas in addition to . 
encourage  the  investor- to  take  due  care  in  the  choice  of an  investment .  firm  it  is 
reasonable to allow Member States to require the investor to ·bear a proportion of any 
loss;  whereas, however, the investor should be covered for at least 90% of his loss 
until the compensation payment-reaches the Community minimum; 
18. Whereas,  however,'. a  harmonized  minimum  level  of  compensation  should  be. 
sufficient to protect the interests of the  small~r investor in the event of the failure of 
an  investment  firm;  whereas  it  would  appear  reasonable  to·  set  the  harmonized 
minimum guarantee level at ECU20 000; 
19. Whereas this same level  was  adopted  by  Parliament and  the  Council  in  Directive 
94/19/E<;::; · 
20. Whereas the schemes of  certain Member States currently offer highe_r levels of  cover, 
whereas, however, it does not seem appropriate to -require that those schemes should 
reduce the cover they offer; 
21. Whereas  ~he retention in the Community of schemes providing cover for investors 
which is higher than the harmonized minimum may, within the same. territory, lead to 
disparities in compensation and unequal conditions of competition between national 
investment firms and branches of firms from other Member. States; whereas, in order 
to  counteract those disadvantages, branches should be  authorized to join their host 
countries' schemes so  that they  can offer their  investors  the  sarrie .  coverage  as  is 
offered by the schemes of the countries in which they are located; whereas it is not ruled  out  ·that  home  Member  State  schemes  should  themselves  offer  such 
complementary cover, subject to. the conditions such schemes may lay down; · 
22. Whereas the o~jective of  this Directive is to ensure a minimum level of protection for 
small investors, including small and medium-sized enterprises, who have the greatest 
need ofprotection; whereas, however, Member States should be  allowed to  exclude 
from  coverage certain other  categ~ries of investors who  have a lesser need of such 
protection. 
23. Whereas a number of Member States have investor compensation schemes under the 
. responsibility of professiona~ organizations;  whereas  other schemes  may  be  set  up 
and administered on a statutory basis; whereas this· variety of status poses a problem 
only  with  regard  to  compulsory  membership  of and  exclusion  from  the  scheme; 
whereas it is  therefore necessary to  take steps tci  limit the powers of schemes in this 
area; 
24. Whereas the investor should receive compensation without excessive delay once he 
has  established  a  valid  claim;  whereas  the  compensation  scheme  itself should  be 
allowed to fix a reasonable period during which claims should be presented; whereas, 
however,  the  fact that such a period has  expired should not be  invoked against an 
investor who for a good reason has not been able to present his claim on time; 
25. Whereas investor information on compensation arrangements is an essential element 
in investor protection and must therefore also be the subject of  a minimum number of 
binding provisions; 
26.  Whereas in principle this Directive requires every investment firm to join an investor 
compensation  scheme;  whereas  the  Directives  governing  the  admission  of any 
investment firm which has its head office in a non-member country, and in particular 
the  Investment  Services  Directive,  allow  Member  States  to  decide  whether  and 
subject to what conditions to permit the branches of such investment firms to operate . 
within their territories; whereas such branches will not enjoy the freedom to  provide ·services under the  second  paragraph of Article  59 of the Treaty,  nor the  right  Qf 
.. ;;;  establishment  in  Member  States  other  than  those  iri  which  they  are  established; 
whereas, ac;cordingly, a Member State admitting such branches_should decide how to 
'· 
apply the principles of  this Directive to such branches in ftCCordance with Article 5 of-
the Investment Services Directive and with the need to protect investors and maintain 
.  .  .  .  .  '  . . 
the  integrity of the  financial  system;  whereas  it  is  essential that  investors at such 
·_branches should be fully a"':are of  the compensation amingements which a~fect them; 
27. Whereas  it  is- not  indispensable  in  this  Directive  to  harmonize  the  methods  of 
financing schemes compensating investors given, on the one hand, that the  cost _of 
ijnancing such schemes must be borne, in principle, by investment firms themselves 
'  '  .  .  ,  . 
. and,  on the  other hand,  that  t~e finru:tcing  capacity  of such schemes _must  be  in 
proportion to their liabilities; whereas this must not, however, jeopardize the stability 
of  the financial sector ofthe Member State.concerned; 
28. Whereas  m  conclusion  a  minimum  harmonization  of . investor  compensation 
arrangements.  appears  necessary · in  order ·  -~o  complete  the  internal · market  for 
investment  firms  ~y giving  investors  confidence  to  deal  with firms  from  other 
Member States as well as locally incorporated firms and by avoiding the difficulties 
.  .  '  ,.  .  ': 
_ that might _arise  from_the appllcatipn' by host Member States of their uncoordinated 
domestic investor protection re~uirements;' whereas a binding ~ommunity  directive is 
the only suitable instrument to achieve the desired objective in the general absence of  .  .  .  .  .  '  .  .  . 
investor compensation arrangements corresponding to the coverage of  the .Investment 
Services  Directive;  wherea~  this  measure  restricts  itself  to . the  minimum  . 
.  ·harmonization that is required, allows ·Member States freedom to  provi_de  wider or 
higher coverage if they .desire and also allows Mem~er States considerable 'freedom 
as. regards the drganization and financing of  investor compensation schemes~ 
. HAVE ADOPTED TIDS DIRECTIVE:· Article 1 
For the purposes of  this Directive the following de,firiitions shall apply : 
1.  "Investment firm"  shall  mean an  in~estment firm  as  defined  in  Article  1  (2)  of the 
Investment  Services  Directive  and  authorized  in  accordance  with  Article  3  of the 
Investmenf Services Directive,  or  ~ credit  institution  the  authorization  of which, 
under  Directives  77/780/EEC7  and  89/646/EEC8,  covers  one  or  more  of  the 
investment  services  listed  in  Section  A  of the· Annex  to  the  Investment  Services 
Directive; 
2.  "Investment business" shall mean an investment service as defined in Article  I (1) of 
the Investment Services Directive and the service referred to  in point 1 of Section C 
of  the Annex to the Investment Services Directive; 
3.  "Instruments"  shall  mean  the  instruments  listed  in  Section B of the  Annex  to  the 
Investment Services Directive; 
4.  "Investor"  shall  mean  a  person  who  has  e11trusted  money  or  instruments  to  an 
investment firm in connection with investment ~usiness; 
5. · "Branch" shall mean a place of business which is a part of  an investment firm, which 
has  no  legal  personality  and  which  provides  investment  services  for  which  the 
investment firm  has been authorized;  all  the  places of business set up  in the  same 
Member State by an investment firm with headquarters in another Memper State shall 
· be regarded as a single branch; 
6.  "Joint· investment"  shall  mean  an  invt:stment  made  in  the  context  of investment 
business, or money placed with an  investment firm  for  investment business,  in  the 
names of two or more persons or over  w~ich  .two or more persons have rights .that 
may operate against the signature of  one or more of those persons. 
7  OJ No L 322, 17.12.1977, p. 30. 
8  OJ No L 386, 30.12.1989, p.  I. ~-' I, 
·  Article 2 
1.  Each  Member  State  shall  ensure  that  within  its  territory  one  or  more  investor 
compensation  schemes  are  established  and  officially  recognized.  'Except · in  the 
•  >  ,•  •  -
circums.t~nces envisaged in the second subparagraph and in  Arti~J~ 5 no  investment 
firm. authorized. in  that Member State  may  ca,rry  on  investment  business  unless  it 
participates in such a scheme. 
A Member State may,  hqwever, exempt a credit institution to  which  this Directive 
.·  .  .  . 
applies, fr~m  ·the obligation to belong to an investor compensation scheme where tha,t 
credit institution is  already exempted  in  accordance with Article  3(1) of Directive 
94119/EC from belonging to a  deposit,gmirante~-scheme  . 
. 2.  The  scheme  shall· 'provide  cover to  investors  in  accordance  with  Article  4  where 
either: 
(i)  the  relevant  competent authorities  have  determined  that  in  their  view  an 
·  investm~ent firm· appears to  be unable for the. time. being, for reasons which 
'  ' 
ate directly  related  to  its  financial  circumstances,  to  meet' its  obligation's 
resulting from investors' claims; or 
'(ii)  'a judicial authority has made a ruling for reasons ·which are  directly related 
to  an  investment  firm's  financial  circumstances· which  has  the  effeCt  of 
suspending investors' ability to make claims against it; 
whichever is the earlier. · 
· Cover must be  p~ovided for claims resulting from the inability of an  in~estment  firm 
to: 
-repay money owed to  in~estors or belonging to .investors andheld on their behalf 
in connection with investment business, or 
-return to  inve'stors. any  instruments  belonging  to  them  arid  physically  held, 
administered qr managed on  their behalf in connection with investment 'business. 
in accordance with the legal and contractual conditions applicable. 
2'1'' 
/ 3. Any claim under paragraph 2 on a credit institution which, in a Member State, would 
be  subject to  this  Directive and  Directive 94/19/EC shall  be  allocated  to  a  scheme 
;_ 
under one or other of  these Directives as that State shall consider appropriate. No claim 
in respect of  the same amount shall be eligible for compensation under both Directives. 
4. The. amount  of an  investor's  claim  shall  be  calculated  according  to  the  legal  and 
contractual conditions, including those relating to set-off and counterclaims applicable 
to  the claim on the  basis of the  amount  of money  or the  value  of the  instruments 
belonging to the investor which the investment firm is unable to repay or return at the 
time of  the decision referred to in paragraph 2. 
Article 3 
Claims  relating  to  transactions  in  connection  with  which  there  has  been  a  criminal 
conviction for money laundering as defined in Article 1 of  Council Directive 911308/EEC  . 
of 10  June  1991  on  prevention of the  use  of the  financial  system  for  the  purpose  of 
money  laundering9,  shall  be  excluded  from  any  compensation  from  investor 
compensation schemes. 
Article 4 
1. Member States shall ensure that the  scheme .provides .  for  coverage of not  less  than 
ECU 20 000 per investor in respect of  the claims referred to in Article 2(2). 
2. Member States may provide that certain investors shall be excluded from the coverage 
of  the scheme or shall be granted a low~r level.of coverage. Those exclusions are listed 
in Annex I. 
3. This Article shall not preclude the retention or adoption of provisions which offer a 
higher or more comprehensive cover for investors. 
9  OJNoL 166,28.6.1991,p. 77. 4. Member States may limitthe cover provided for in paragraph 1 or that referred to in 
paragraph 3 to a  specified percentage of the investor's daiin  . .However, the perc~ntage 
covered fuust be equal to or-exceed 90% of  the claim _until the amount to be paid under 
the scheme reaches ECU 20 000. 
Article 5 
1. If  an investment firm req.uired by Article 2(1) to take part in a scheme does not comply 
with the obligations incumbent on it as a member of  an investor compensation scheme, 
'  '  ' 
/  .  ' 
·the  competent authorities  which · issued  the  atithori~tion shall  be  notified  and,  _in 
.  . 
.  .  .  .  .  .  .  ( 
collaboration  with  the  compensation  scheme;  shall  take  all  appropriate  measures, 
· ·  including the imposition of  sanctions, to ensure that the investment firm  ~omplies with 
its oblig~tions; 
2. If those measures faH  to secure compliance on the part of the investment firm,  the 
scheme. may, where riationallaw permits the exclusion of  a member, with the express 
consent of the competent authorities, give  ~ot less than twelve .months' notice of its 
intention of excluding theinvestment firm from membership of  the scheme. If, on the 
expiry of the notice period, the investment firm has not complied wit~ its obligations, 
.  .  . 
the· compensation scheme  may,  again  having  obtained  the  express  consent  of the 
. competent authorities, proceed to exclusion. 
3. Where national law permits, and with the ~xpress consent of the competent authorities· 
which  issued. its  authorization,  an  investment  firm . excluded  from  an  investor 
'  .  I  ,  • 
compensation scheme may continue its ·activities if, before its exclusion, it has made · 
alternative coinpensatiqn arrangements which ensure that investqrs will benefit from a 
coverage at least equivalent to that offered by the officially recognized schem~. 
jL If an investment firm. the exclusion of which is proposed under paragraph 2 is unable 
to  make  alte~ative arrangements  w~ich comply  with  the  conditions  prescribed  in 
23 paragraph 3, then the competent authorities which issued its authorization shall revoke 
if  forthwith. 
Article 6 
Investors with an investment firm when the authorization is .withdrawn shall continue to 
be covered by the investor compensation scheme. 
Article 7 
1. Investor compensation  schemes  established  and  officially  recognized  in  a  member 
State in accordance with Article 2(1) shall cover the investors at branches set up by 
investment firms in other Member States. 
Where the level and/or scope, including the percentage of cover offered by the host 
member State investor compensation scheme exceeds the level and/or scope of cover 
provided in the  Member State  in which  an  investment firm -is  authorized,  the  host 
Member State  shall  ensure  that there  is  an  officially  recognized  scheme  within  its 
territory which a  branch may join voluntarily  in  order to  supplement the guarantee 
which its  investors already enjoy by  virtue of its membership of its  home Member 
State scheme. 
The scheme to be joined by the branch shall cover the category of  institution to which 
it belongs or most closely corresponds in the host Member State. 
Member States shall ensure that objective conditions relating to  the membership ·of 
these branches form part of all  investor compensation schemes.  Admission shall  be 
conditional  on  fulfilment  of the  relevant  obligations  of membership  including  in 
particular payment of any contribution and other charges. Member States shall follow 
the guiding principles set out in Annex II in implementing this paragraph. 2. If  a branch granted voluntary. membership under paragraph 1. does not comply with the 
.. , obligations incumbent oil it as  a member of an  investor compensation scheme,  the 
. eompetent  authorities  which  issued  the  ·authorization ·shall·. ·be  notified  arid,  ·in 
collaboration with. the  compensation scheme,  shall  take  all  appropriate  measures  to 
ensure that the aforementioned obligations are complied with. 
if those  measures  fall  to  secure  the  br~ch's compliance  with  the  afore~entioned 
obligations, after ~  appropriate period of notice of not less than twelve months the 
compensation scheme may,·with the consent of  the competent authorities which issued 
the authorization, exclude the branch. Investors shall be informed of  the withdrawal of 
the supplementary cover  . 
. (  r,. 
Article 8 
1. The coverage referred in in Article 4(1), (3) and (4) shall apply to the aggregate claim 
of the  investor  under  this  Directive  irrespective  of the  number  of accounts,. the. 
currency and the location within the Community. 
.  '  ' 
· 2. The  sh~e of each  investor  in  a  joint  investment  shall  be  taken  into  account. m 
calculating the coverage provide4 foi in Artiple 4(1), (3) and (4). 
In the absence of  special provisions tQ.e c9mpensation shall be divided equally between. 
the investors in the joint investment. 
Member States may provide that claims relating to a joint investment to .which two or 
more  persons  are  entitled  as  members  of a  business  partnership,  association. or 
grouping of a similar nature, Without legal personality, may be aggregated and treated 
as if made by a single investor for the purpose of  calculating the limits. provided for in . 
Article 4(1), (3) and'(4). 
3. Where the investor is not absolutely entitled to the sums or securities held, the person. 
who is absolutely entitled shall receive the compensation provided that that person has 
. .  '  '  '  . 
been identified or is identifiable before the date referred to in Article 2(2). If there are 
2J · several persons ·who are absolutely entitled, the share of each under the arrangements 
subject to which the sums ot the securities are managed shall be taken into account 
when the limits provided for in Article 4(1), (3) and (4) are calculated. 
This provision shall not apply to collective investment undertakings. 
Article 9 
1. The compensation scheme shall take appropriate measures to  inform investors of the 
decision referred to in Article 2(2) and shall be allowed to fix a period or not less than 
six months during which investors may be required to submit their claims. · 
However, the expiry of such a period may not be invoked by the scheme in order to 
deny compensation to  an investor who has been unable to  assert his claim under the 
compensation scheme in time. 
2. The  scheme  shall  pay  investors'  claims  as  soon  as  possible  and at the· latest  three 
months after the eligibility and the amount of  the claim have been established. 
Article 10 
1. Member States shall ensure that investment firms take appropriate measures to provide 
actual and intending investors with the information necessary for the identification of 
the investor compensation scheme of which the investment firm and its branches are 
members within the Community or any alternative arrangement provided for in Article 
2(1)  second  subparagraph  or  Article  5(3).  The  investors  shall  be  informed  of the 
provisions  of the  investor  compensation  scheme  or  any  alternative  arrangement 
applicable, including the amount and scope of the cover offered by the compensation 
scheme. That information shall be made available in a readily comprehensible manner. 
Information shall also be given on request on the conditions governing compensation 
and the formalities which must be fulfilled in order to obtain compensation. ,· 
· 2. The  information referred  to  in  paragraph  1 ·shall  be  made  available  in .the  manner 
.':bf  provided by natioJ.lall~w in the. officjal language _or  languages. of the Membe( State in  · 
' 
,,  which a branch is establisheq. 
Article 11 
!.Member States shall check that branches established by an investment firin  which has · 
its head office outside the Community have cover equivalent to that prescribed In this 
Directive.  Failing that,  Member  States may, subject to  Article  5 of  .the  Investment 
.  .  . 
'  •  •  '  'I  ,  •  •  .'  • 
Services Directive, stipulate that branches established by an investment firm which has 
its head office  outsid~ the  Co~munity must joint investor. compensation  ·s~hemes in 
operation within their territories . 
. 2. Actual and intenqing investors at· branches established by an  investment firm  which 
has  its  head office outside the  Community shall be  provid~d by the investment firm 
with all relevant information concerning the  co~perisation arrangements which c.over 
their investments. 
3. The  information  ref~tred to  in-paragraph 2 shall be  made  available  in·tlie oftlciaJ 
· language or languages of the Member State in which the branch is established in the 
manner prescribed by national law and shall be drafted in a clear and cQmprehensible 
form. 
Article 12 
Without prejudice to any other rights which it may have under national law, an investor 
compensation scheme which pays investors' claims shall have the right of  subrogation to 
the rights of the investors in the liquidation proceedings for an amount equivalent to  its 
payment. Article 13 
No latter than three years after the date mentioned in Article 14(1), the Commission shall 
present a report to  the European Parliament and the Cou.ncil  on the application of this 
Directive, accompanied where appropriate by proposals for its revision. 
Ariicle14 
l.  .Member  States  shall  bring  into  force  the .laws,  regulations  and  administrative 
provisions necessary to comply with this Directive by 31  December 1996. They shall 
forthwith inform the Commission thereof. 
When  Member  States  adopt. these  measur~s, they. shall  contain a  ref~rence .  to  this 
Directive or shall be accompanied by such reference on  the occasion of their official 
'  '  .  . 
p~blication. The methods of  making such reference shall be laid down by the Member 
States. 
2. Member States  shall  communicate  to  the  Commission  the  texts  of the  main  laws, 
regulations and administrative decisions which they adopt in the fieldcovered by this 
Directiye. 
Article 15 
Article 12 of  Directive 93/22/EEC shall be repealed as from the date referred to in Article 
14(1). 
Article 16 
· This Directive is addressed to the Member States. 
Done at Brussels, 
For the Parliament,  For the Council, 
The President  The President ANNEX 1 
. LIST OF THE EXCLUSIONS REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE 4(2}  • 
1  .. Institutional investors including : 
Investment firms as.defined in Article 1(2) of  the Investment Services. Directive. 
Credit  institutions  ~s  defined  in  the  first  indent  of Article  1  of Directive 
77/780/EEC. 
Financial institutions as defined in Article 1  (  6) of  Directive 89/646/EEC.· 
Insurance undertakings. 
Collective investment undertakings. 
Pensioi1 or retirement funds. 
Other institutional investors. 
2.  Professional investors 
3.  Supranational, Government and central administrative authorities . 
. 4.  Provincial, regional, local or municipal authorities. 
· 5.  Directors  and  managers  of and members personally  liable  in  the  investment firm, 
holders of at least 5% of the capital of the investment firm,  persons responsible for 
carrying out the statutory audits of the investment firm's accounting documents and· 
investors with similar status in other companies in the same group. 
6.  Close relatives arid third parties acting on behalf of the investots referred to at point 
5. 7.  Other companies in the same group. 
8.  Investors who have any responsibility for, or have directly or indirectly profited from 
events relating to  the  investment firm  or its business which gave rise to  the  firm's 
financial_difficulties. _  ,  .  , 
9.  Companies which are of such a size that they are not permitted to draw up  abridged 
balance sheets under Article 11  of the Fourth Council Directive (78/660/EEC) of 25 
- - . 
July 1978 based on Article 54(3)(g) of the Treaty on the annual accounts of certain 
-·types of  companieslo. 
10  OJ. No L 222, 14.8.1978, p, 11. Directive as last ~mended  by Directive 94/8/EC of21.3.1994 (OJ No L 
82, 25.3.1994, p. 33)  - - - -- - - - - '  --ANNEXII 
GUIDING' PRINCIPLES 
Where a branch applies to join a host Member State scheme for supplementary cover, the' 
host Member State scheme will bilaterally establish with the home Member State scheme 
appropriate rules and procedures for paying compensation to investors at  th~t branch, The 
following principles shall apply both to the drawing up  of those procedures and  in the 
framing  of the  membership conditions application to  such a branch (as  referred to  in 
Article 7(1)): 
a.  the  host  Member State  scheme  will  retain full  rights  to  impose  its  obje~tive and 
generally applied rules on participating investment firms; it  will-be able to require the 
provision of relevant information and have the right to  verify such information with 
the home Member State's competent authorities; 
b.  the  host Member State  scheme  will  meet claims  for  supplementary ,compensation · 
after it has been informed by the home Member State's competent authorities of the 
decisio,n referred to in Article 2(2).  The host Member State scheme will  retain full 
rights  to  verify  a~  investor's  entitlement  according  to  its  own  standards  and 
mocedures before paying supplementary compensation; 
c.  home Member State and host Member State schemes will co-operate fully with each 
other to ensure investors receive compensation promptly and inthe correct amounts. 
·-In particular, they will agree on how the existence of  a counterclaim which may give 
/  rise to set-off under either scheme will affect the compen~ation paid to the investor by 
each scheme; 
d.  host Member  State  scheme  will  be  entitled to  charge  branches for  supplementary 
cover on an appropriate basis which takes into account the guarantee funded by the 
home Member State scheme. To  facilitate charging, the host Member State scheme will be entitled to assume that its liability will in all circumstances be limited to the 
excess of the cover it has offered over the cover offered by the home Member State 
regardless  of whether the  home  Member  State  actually  pays  any  compensation  in 
respect of  claims by investors within the host Member State's territory. ·,  COM(94) 585 final 
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